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i V I
SPECIALFEATURES OF MARKETS WITH
NETWORK EFFECTS
T
Sources of Network Effects and the Reversal of the Law of Demand
'>!'
Many network industries exhibit increasing returns to scale in production:
unit (average) cost decreases with increasing scale of production. Often
incremental cost isnegligible (for example in software). However, these are
also features of non-network industries and are not the defining feature of
network industries. Thus, increasing returns to scale in production is also
not the defining feature of the competition policy issues that are rooted in
the existence of networks.
Networks are composed of complementary nodes and links. The crucial
defining feature of networks is the complementarity between the various
nodes and links. A servicedelivered over a network requires the use of two
or more network components. Thus, network components are comple-
mentary to each other. ~
A common and defining feature of network industries is the fact that
they exhibit increasing returns to scale in consumption, commonly called
~ 'network effects'. The existence of network externalities is the key reason
for the importance, growth, and profitability of network industries and the
New Economy. A market exhibits network effects(or network externalities)
when the value to a buyer of an extra unit is higher when more units are
sold, everything elsebeing equal.
Network effects arise because of complementarities. In a traditional
network, network externalities arise because a typical subscriber can reach
more subscribers in a larger network. See Figure 5.1, which depicts a tra-
ditional telecommunications network where customers A, B, . "., G are
connected to a switch at S. Although goods with 'access to the switch' AS,
BS, . . ", GS have the same industrial classification and traditional eco-
nomics would classify them as substitutes, they are used as complements.
In particular, when customer A makes a phone call to customer B, he uses
both AS and BS.
In a virtualnetwork, externalities arise because larger sales of components
of type A induce larger availability of complementary components B1,". .,
Bn' thereby increasing the value of components of type A. See Figure 5.2.
The increased value of component A results in further positive feedback.
Despite the cycleof positive feedbacks, it istypically expected that the value
of component A doesnot explode to infinity because the additional positive
feedback isexpected to decrease with increases in the size of the network.
In traditional non-network industries, the willingness to pay for the last
unit of a good decreases with the number of units sold. This is called the
w
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lawof demand, and istraditionally considered to hold for almost allgoods.I
However, the existence of network effects implies that, as more units are
sold, the willingness to pay for the last unit may be higher. This means that
for network goods, the fundamental lawof demand isviolated: for network
goods, some portions of the curve demand can slope upwards. This means
that, for some portions of the demand curve, as sales expand, people are
willing to pay more for the last unit.
The law of demand is still correct if one disregards the effects of the
expansion of sales on complementary goods. But, as increased sales of a
network good imply an expansion in the sales of complementary goods,
the value of the last unit increases. Combining the traditional downward-
sloping effect with the positive effect due to network expansion can result
in a demand curve that has an upward-sloping part.
The key reason for the appearance of network externalities is the com-
plementarity between the components of a network. Depending on the
network, the network effectmay be direct or indirect. When customers are
identified with components, the externality is direct. Consider for example
a typical two-way network, such as the local telephone network of Figure
5.1. In this n-nodes 2-way network, there are 212(12 - 1)potential goods. An
additional (12+ 1th)customerprovidesdirectexternalitiesto allother cus-
tomers in the network by adding 212 potential new goods through the pro-
vision of a complementary link (say ES) to the existing links.
In typical one-way networks, the network effect is only indirect. When
there are m varieties of component A and 12 varieties of component Bas in
Figure 5.2 (and all A-type goods are compatible with all of B-type), there
are mn potential composite goods. An extra customer yields indirect exter-
nalities to other customers, by increasing the demand for components of
types A and Band thereby (because of the presence of economies of scale)
potentially increasing the number of varieties of each component that are
available in the market.
Exchange networks (financial networks such astheNYSE and NASDAQ,
commodities, futures, and options exchanges aswellas business-to-business
'B2B' exchanges) also exhibit indirect network externalities. There are two
ways in which these externalities arise. First, externalities arise in the act of
exchanging assets or goods. Second, externalities may arise in the array of
vertically related services that compose a financial transaction. These
include the servicesof a broker, bringing the offer to the floor,matching the
offer, etc. The second type of externalities are similar to other vertically-
related markets. The firstwayinwhichexternalities arise infinancial markets ii!!
ismore important.
The act of exchanging goods or assets brings together a trader who is
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Table5.1 Quantities, market coverage, and prices under incompatibility
Note: Profits of firm I are ill, All variables are in dollars. Subscripts indicate firms;
il signifies profits.
Source: Economides and Flyer (1998).
Monopolymaymaximizetotal surplus
Fifth, in industries with significant network externalities, under conditions
of incompatibility between competing platforms, monopoly may maximize
social surplus.This isbecause,whenstrong network effectsare present, avery
large market share of one platform creates significant network benefits for
thisplatform whichcontribute to largeconsumers' and producers' surpluses.
Number Sales of Sales of Sales of Market Price of Price of Price of Price of
of firms largest second third coverage largest second third smallest
I firm qj firm q2 firm q3 "kj lqj firm PI firm P2 firm P3 firm PI
I 0.6666 0.6666 0.222222 2.222e-1
2 0.6357 0.2428 0.8785 0.172604 0.0294 2.948e-2
3 0.6340 0.2326 0.0888 0.9555 0.170007 0.0231 0.0035 3.508e-3
4 0.6339 0.2320 0.0851 0.9837 0.169881 0.0227 0.0030 4.533e-4
5 0.6339 0.2320 0.0849 0.9940 0.169873 0.0227 0.0030 7.086e-5
6 0.6339 0.2320 0.0849 0.9999 0.169873 0.0227 0.0030 9.88e-Il
7 0.6339 0.2320 0.0849 0.9999 0.169873 0.0227 0.0030 0
Note: qj indicates sales of firm I, where the sum of sales of all firms is normalized to be
less than or equal to one. Prices are in dollars. The ith firm produces quantity qiat price Pi'
and firms are ordered in decreasing quantity so that ql > qz> q3'etc.
Source: Economides and Flyer (1998).
Table 5.2 Profits, consumers' and total surplus under incompatibility
Number ITI ITz IT3 Profits of Total Consumers' Total
of firms last firm industry surplus CS surplus TS
I ITI profits
"kJiilj
1 0.1481 0.1481 0.1481 0.148197 0.29629651
2 0.1097 7.15ge-3 7.15ge-3 0.1168 0.173219 0.29001881
3 0.1077 5.377e-3 3.508e-4 3.508e-4 0.1135 0.175788 0.28878819
4 0.1077 5.285e-3 3.096e-4 1.474e-5 0.1132 0.175483 0.28868321
5 0.1077 5.28Ie-3 2.592e-4 8.44e-7 0.1132 0.175478 0.28867817
6 0.1077 5.281e-3 2.58ge-4 1.18e-14 0.1132 0.175478 0.28867799
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intense race to be the dominant firm.In network industries, weoften observe
Schumpeterian races for market dominance.
A good recent example of Schumpeterian competition isthe competition
among dot-coms in 1999-2000. As explained earlier, economic models
imply very high valuation of the dominant firm compared to other firms in
the same network industry. The same perception prevailed in Wall Street.
During that period, dot-com firms advertised veryintensely and subsidized
consumers to be able to achieve the coveted dominant position in the
market. The easy availability of capital for dot-coms at the time made it easy
to observe their behavior as they 'burned' almost allthe cash they had to get
the top market share. Many of the dot-coms failed because demand for their
serviceswas much lower than predicted or because of flawsin their business
models. However, all the successful dot-coms, such as eBay,Amazon, and
Yahoo, also followed this strategy.
Generally, in network industries, the costs of entry may be higher but the
rewards of success may also be higher compared to non-network industries.
III
Path dependence
Atenth implication of network effectsisthe importance ofpath-dependence.
Path-dependence isthe dependence of a systemor network on past decisions
of producers and consumers. For example, the price at which a VHS player
can be sold today is path-dependent because it depends on the number of
VHS players sold earlier (the installed base of VHS players). The existence
of an installed base of consumers favors an incumbent. However, competi-
tors with significant product advantages or a better pricing strategy can
overcome the advantage of an installed base.
For example, in the market for video players, VHS overcame Beta after
six years of a higher installed base by Beta. This was an implication of:
~
!II
1. Sony's mistakes in disregarding network externalities and not licensing
the Beta format;
Matsushita's widespread licensing of VHS;
The fact that one low-end low-price VHS player can contribute as
much to the network effect as a high-end high-price Beta player.
2.
3.
In the BetalVHS case, it is clear that Sony mistakenly disregarded the
network effects that arose from the availability of rental tapes of pre-
recorded movies. The main function of video recorders was originally
thought to be 'time delay' in watching material recorded from the TV.The
pre-recorded market emerged later,first as amarket wheremovieswere sold,
and later as a movies rental market. The emergence of markets for 'movies
for sale'and 'movies for rent', whichhad to berecorded inparticular format,110 The neweconomy and beyond
created a significant complementary good for Beta and VHS players. The
significant cost of physical distribution of tapes throughout the country
and the costs of carrying a significant inventory of titles made the choice of
what movies to bring and in what format crucially dependent on present and
forecast demand which was closelycorrelated with the present and forecast
installed base of video players in each format. Thus, although network
effects and path dependence played a crucial role in determining the fate of
Beta, the outcome was far from predetermined. Early, more aggressive
licensing of the Betaformat by Sonyor the early promotion of low-end Beta
players could have reversed the demise of the Beta format.6
COMPETITION POLICY ISSUES IN NETWORK
INDUSTRIES
One-sided Bottlenecks
Interconnection issues in telecommunications, railroads, airline, and other
transportation networks are very common. Often one company has exclu-
sivecontrol of part of the network, which is required by others to provide
services.Wecall this network part 'a bottleneck.' Generally, bottlenecks can
be divided into twocategories: one-sided and two-sided. A one-sided bottle-
neck is monopolized by a firm and this firm does not require the use of a
different bottleneck. An example of such abottleneck isshown aslink ABin
Figure 5.5.An example of suchabottleneck isthe connection oflocal service
telecommunications subscribers to a switch. This istypically called 'the last
mile', and often called 'the local loop' .After the 1984breakup of AT&T,the
local loop has been monopolized by the local exchange carrier, typically a
Regional Bell Operating Company ('RBOC') or GTE (General Telephone
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utilizes high frequencies transmission though copper local loops. Thus,
they mandate alternative access prices for unbundled parts of the
network (unbundled network elements 'UNEs') at cost-based prices. The
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and state Public Utilities
Commissions (PUCs) accepted the view that lease prices should be based
on forward-looking costs rather than on historical, accounting, or embed-
ded costs (which was favored by RBOCs). In setting prices for unbundled
network elements, the FCC and state PUCs also rejected the relevance of
prices based on private opportunity cost, such as the 'Efficient Components
Pricing Rule', ('ECPR'). Such rules derive prices for components from
the monopoly end-to-end prices. Thus, the ECPR and its varieties would
guarantee the monopolist's profits despite market structure changes in
the markets for components that are used to create final services (see
Economides and White 1995; Economides 2003). The 1996 Act also
imposes a number of rules to prevent anti-competitive actions in telecom-
munications, such as number portability, mandatory resale of services,
transparency, non-discrimination, etc. A full discussion of these rules can
be found at Economides (1999). Still,the 1996Act missed opportunities to
define technical standards. Unfortunately, legal maneuvers by the incum-
bent local exchange carriers and high prices for the unbundled network
elements considerably delayed significant entry into local telecommunica-
tions markets.
Two-sidedBottlenecks
In a two-sided bottleneck, each of two firms is monopolist, each with a
different bottleneck, and eachfirmrequires the other's bottleneck to produce
its output. For example, suppose there are two local telephone companies,
each customer subscribes only to one local telephone company, and each
company requires the other's network to complete calls. This could be rep-
resented in Figure 5.5 with the second link BC (number 3) removed, and
considering AB to belong to firm 1, BC to belong to firm 2, firm 1 selling
serviceABC and firm 2 sellingserviceCBA. In the context of this example,
each of firms 1and 2 buys access termination from the other. If each firm
i = 1,2, sellsboth servicesABC and CBA, then each firm buys both access
origination and accesstermination from the other.
Many of the issues of traditional bottlenecks havebeen dealt with by reg-
ulation in the United States and the European Union. In monopolized one-
way bottlenecks, such as access origination and termination used in the
creation of long-distance calls,there has been atendency to decrease thereg-
ulated prices, but prices are still high. In the two-way bottleneck of access
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Another example from the computing industry illustrates a situation of
market power creation specificto networks. Suppose that firm A chooses to
make its product A incompatible with the products of other firms that
perform similar functions, and it also subsidizes firms that produce com-
plementary goods B to its product A.9Alternatively, we may assume that
firm A subsidizes its own division that sellscomplementary goods B. As a
result:
1. The value of firm Ns product increase;
2. The entry hurdle of firm Ns rivals increases;
3. There is possible creation of market power.
Firm Ns defense will be that its actions are pro-competitive since their
primary cause is the enhancement of value of product A. For the point of
view of Ns competitors, the actions of A look very much anti-competitive
since the abundance of complementary goods B for product A puts them
at a competitive disadvantage.
Note that the existence of incompatibility is a necessary condition for
possible creation of market power. Moreover, the key to increasing social
welfare is a potential move to compatibility. That is,assuming that innov-
ation and product availability would not be reduced, the best of all worlds
is to have public standards and full compatibility. However, it is very
difficult for US antitrust authorities to intervene and/or define standards.
Besides the use of technical standards, firms can also use bundling and
other pricing strategies as well as non-price discrimination strategies to
leverage market power across markets.
In networks, as in other settings, there are potentially anti-competitive
issues arising from the possibility of vertical integration and the behavior
of vertically integrated firms.These may include, first, the bundling of com-
ponents through vertical integration contracts, or manipulation of techni-
cal standards so that an entrant will not be able to enter in only one of the
components markets, but willhave to enter in both. Often firms have exper-
tise or a technical advantage in only one component, and would like to
enter only in the market for that component. An incumbent can strategi-
cally alter the market environment through acquisition or contract so that
the entrant can only be successful if it enters more than one market. This
increases the financial hurdle for an entrant, and it also forcesit to sellcom-
ponents where it does not have expertise. Thus, it makes it more likely that
entry will not occur.
A vertically integrated firm can also use discrimination in prices charged
to a subsidiary compared to prices charged to a downstream competitor,
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efficiency.The possibility exists of a lock-in to a technology and a path
which, when decisions taken in everyperiod, looks optimal given past deci-
sions, but is sub-optimal if earlier investment decisions had been delayed
and all the decisions were taken at once. In a world with network effects a
lock-in in an inferior technology can easily occur as firms (and countries)
-find it more desirable to invest further in the technology in which they
already invested. This can occur under perfect competition. The problem
can easily become much more important under oligopoly, as firms race to
become the dominant firm, giventhe importance of dominance inanetwork
industry.
Innovation Issues
An important antitrust issue is the speed of innovation in a network
industry as affected by strategic decisions of firms and potentially anti-
competitive actions. The effects of actions on innovation are important
because innovation affects the welfare of future consumers, and this should
be taken into consideration in an antitrust action. The difficulty in dealing
with innovation issues in an antitrust action arises from the fact that the
efficiency and intensity of innovation in monopoly compared to perfect
competition and oligopoly are open questions in economics. Thus, it isvery
hard to make general statements on innovation in an antitrust context.
II
Criteria to be Used for Antitrust Intervention in Network Industries
..
When an antitrust intervention is considered in a network industry, a
number of considerations that arise out of the nature of network industries
have to be taken into account. These are explained in detail in earlier sec-
tions. First, the benchmark of the 'but for' world that should be considered
should be a network industries equilibrium with significant inequality,
rather than a perfectly competitive equilibrium. Second, competitors' harm
should not be a sufficient reason for intervention. The right question is,
'were consumers (past, present, future) harmed by specific actions?' Third,
uncertainty should be taken into account, and caution should be used in
guessing how a high-tech industry would haveevolved'but for the anti-com-
petitive action(s). Fourth, it ispossible that monopoly may maximize total
surplus. Fifth, that it will not be possible to sustain a long-term equal-
market-shares equilibrium, and a short-term equal-market-shares equilib-
rium may have low total surplus. Sixth, path dependence and the value of
the installed base are limited by Schumpeterian competition, and upheavals
are not uncommon in network industries. Seventh, especially in software
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these cases, it is clear that a market without intervention will not result in
the desired outcome. I willleavecase (2)aside, since adiscussion of it would
lead us to a detailed discussion of specific industries. The requirements for
case (3)are typically met in many network industries, sinceexpansion of the
network creates network effects that are typically not fully internalized by
markets. However,it would be foolish to advocate regulation asthe standard
solution in network industries because of the existence of network effects.
Often, a much smaller intervention, such as subsidization of the network to
help network effectswill be enough.
In case (1), where it is clear that competition and its benefits cannot be
achieved by market forces, regulation may be a solution. The significant
advantage of industry-specific regulation is that it can be tailored to the
specificsof the industry, and specifyrules on pricing and availability of par-
ticular products and services.Regulators, such as the FCC, also have staffs
that can provide impartial technical advice that would be unavailable to a
court.
However, regulation has a number of drawbacks. First, it is best suited
for industries with well defined and not changing products and services.
With stable product definitions, rules can be devised and specificpricing can
be implemented if necessary. Second, as a corollary to the first observation,
regulation is not well suited in industries with high technological change
and frequently changing product definitions. Moreover, in an industry with
fast technical progress, regulation can be used by the regulated companies
to keep prices high, as exemplified by telecommunications regulation.
Third, often regulators are veryclose to the interests of the regulated parties
rather than to the interests of the public. Fourth, experience has shown that
often regulators are not wellinformed about keyvariables aswellaschanges
in the industry. Fifth, regulators at both the state and federal levels are
under pressure and influence by both the executive and the legislative part
of government, and cannot be as impartial as acourt. These drawbacks can
create significant surplus loss due to regulation.
In summary, regulation should be used sparingly inindustries with stable
products, if it is clear that antitrust action has failed, and keeping in mind
that regulation can also cause a significant surplus loss.
CONCLUSION
This chapter isa start of an in-depth discussion of public policy in network
industries. Ibelievethat it isfair to say that the legal systemdoes not yethave
a framework for analysis of competition policy issues innetwork industries.
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outgoing, and irrespective of the destination. Similarly, Internet service providers buy
backbone connectivity at rates that depend just on the size of the pipe they utilize and
irrespective of whether they are incoming or outgoing, and of the destination.
3. It is anecdotally known that Cantor .Fitzgerald, which has a 70 per cent market share in
the secondary market for US government 30 year bonds, offered to Salomon (the largest
'primary dealer' and trader of US bonds) prices equal to one tenth to one fifth of those
charged to small traders. This is consistent with profit maximization by Cantor Fitzgerald
because of the liquidity (network effect) brought to the market by Salomon which is by
far the largest buyer ('primary dealer') in the auctions of US government bonds.
4. For a detailed discussion, see Economides and Himmelberg (1995).
5. If the distribution of the willingness to pay is distributed away from 0, an industry with
network effects exhibits the finiteness property (Shaked and Sutton 1983), with a finite
maximum number of active firms despite positive profits.
6. An often-cited example on path dependence is the prevalence of the QWERTY keyboard
despite claims of more efficient function by the alternative Dvorak keyboard. For many
business applications, and for antitrust purposes, the QWERTY example is not crucial
because there was no significant strategic business interest in the success of either design.
7. AT&T claimed that the main reason for its refusal to interconnect was the low technical
standards of the independents, as well as incompatibilities, that would jeopardize
AT&T's network after interconnection. While there is some truth to those claims, it is
unlikely that they applied to all independents. Moreover, once acquired by AT&T, inde-
pendents were interconnected with AT&T's network, after some modifications. This
shows that the refusal to interconnect was mainly a strategic and commercial decision
rather than a technical one.
8. This is not just a theoretical possibility. Telecom New Zealand ('TNZ'), operating in an
environment of weak antitrust and regulatory intervention (so-called 'light-handed reg-
ulation') offered such high termination fees that the first entrant into local telecommu-
nications, Clear, survives only by refusing to pay interconnection fees to TNZ, while the
second entrant, BellSouth New Zealand exited the local telecommunications market.
9. For example, one can think of A as a computer operating system, and B as an applica-
tion. OS manufacturers can and do embed software routines that are useful to applica-
tion software developers since they reduce the cost of writing applications.
10. See Economides and Siow (1988) for a discussion of the benefits of B2B and other
exchanges.
II. For a discussion of the Microsoft case, see Economides (200Ia, 2001b, 2002) and
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/.
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